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Abstract
Els models de creixement amb aprenentatge suposen que el coneixement après
en producció es transmet de forma lliure i instantània a tota leconomia. En con-
seqüència, leconomia presenta economies descala creixents i el creixement de la
productivitat (TFP) és endògena. No obstant, el supòsit de difusió instantània del
coneixement és poc realista. La difusió del coneixement necessita temps i algun
canal de transmissió. En aquest article suposem que el coneixement es transmet
amb la contractació de treballadors nous (learning-by-hiring). En el nostre model
la difusió instantània i lliure de coneixement pot ocórrer només dins dun sector.
La difusió de coneixement entre sectors pot ocórrer només a través de la mobilitat
de treballadors, i per tant, el mercat de treball determina el nivell i la taxa de
creixement de productivitat (TFP). Estudiem com els costos de mobilitat laboral
modiquen lequilibri sota dos escenaris: creixement endogen i exogen. A més,
demostrem que daltres ineciències del mercat laboral, com són les taxes o els
costos de cerca, poden reduir la mobilitat laboral, i per tant, modicar la TFP.
Abstract
Growth models of learning-by-doing assume that knowledge learned in produc-
tion gets freely and instantly spread to the whole economy. As a result, the econ-
omy exhibits aggregate increasing returns and the total factor productivity (TFP)
growth is endogenous. However, the assumption of instant di¤usion of knowledge
seems unrealistic. Di¤usion of knowledge takes time and requires some channel of
transmission. In this paper we assume this transmission channel is learning-by-
hiring, since knowledge is embodied in workers. We present a model where the free
and instant di¤usion of knowledge may exist only within sectors, but not across
sectors. Di¤usion of knowledge across sectors can only occur through the mobility
of labor and, therefore, the labor market determines both the level and growth of
TFP. We investigate how labor mobility costs modify the equilibrium outcome of
such an economy considering two scenarios: endogenous and exogenous growth.
Moreover, we show that other labor market ine¢ ciencies, such as labor income
taxes or labor search costs, may reduce labor mobility and therefore modify TFP.
JEL classication codes: O41.
Keywords: Learning-by-doing, learning-by-hiring, labor mobility, economic growth.
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1. Introduction
It has been established that di¤erences in income per capita among developed coun-
tries cannot be accounted for by di¤erences in capital per worker, but by di¤erences in
Total Factor Productivity (Prescott, 1998). Thus, it must be a factor or factors other
than accumulation of capital that account for di¤erences in worker productivities across
countries. Examples are di¤erent work practices, di¤erent within rm work organiza-
tion, di¤erent resistance to the adoption of new technologies, or simply a di¤erent policy
arrangement each society employs. In this paper we propose and analyze labor mobility
as one of these factors. We use worker mobility as a mechanism of knowledge di¤usion
across sectors. Di¤erent degrees of knowledge di¤usion imply di¤erent exploitation of
available knowledge and, therefore, di¤erent productivity growth across countries.
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
UK
US
-.5
0
.5
1
1.
5
gT
FP
94
08
5 10 15 20 25
Job2job(1994)
Figure 1. Labor mobility (% of job-to-job mobility in a 3 year spell) and TFP growth.
Source: data on labor mobility from Jolivet, Postel-Vinay et al (2006) and TFP
growth is own computations based on The Conference Board Total Economy
Database, January 2010, http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm.
Figure 1 plots a measure of labor mobility for 10 European countries and the US in
1994 against the TFP growth rate in the period 1994-2008. Data on labor mobility is
taken from Jolivet, Postel-Vinay et al (2006), who compute percentage of individuals
who changed job in a 3-year-spell using ECHP and PSID databases. This measure
allows us to distinguish three groups of countries according to their labor mobility
level. The UK and Denmark are highly mobile, with at least one out of ve employees
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changing jobs in 3 years. In the other end, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, France and
Italy have a very immobile labor force. In the middle range there is Ireland, the
US, the Netherlands and Germany. Clearly, there is a cultural component to labor
mobility: countries with Germanic language have more mobile labor than countries
with romance language. Figure 1 shows a positive relationship between worker mobility
and TFP growth. Only Denmark, which has a very particular labor market, appears
as an outlier, with high mobility and low TFP growth.1 The correlation between
labor mobility and TFP growth is as high as 0.72 and signicant at the 2% level when
Denmark is excluded, consistent with our thesis that labor mobility plays a major role
in explaining TFP growth.
We build on the seminal paper of Arrow (1962), where learning-by-doing is the
main determinant of rms productivity growth. The main idea in Arrows paper is
that by producing a product workers gain experience and become more e¢ cient in pro-
duction. Arrow assumes that knowledge learned in production gets freely and instantly
spread to the whole economy. As a result, he obtains aggregate increasing returns
and therefore endogenous TFP and economic growth. Hence, countries with the same
available knowledge will have the same TFP and growth rate. Certainly, however, the
assumption of instant di¤usion of knowledge seems unrealistic. We assume instead that
di¤usion of knowledge across sectors takes time and requires some channel of transmis-
sion. In particular we assume that knowledge is embodied in workers and rms have
to hire external workers to learn (learning-by-hiring). Hence, hiring decisions and thus
worker mobility across sectors a¤ect knowledge exploitation and thus the TFP.
Labour mobility in our model is constrained by a labour market ine¢ ciency, namely
mobility costs. Mobility costs may represent training costs when hiring new workers,
loss of productivity with moving if some knowledge was rm/sector specic, hiring costs,
search cost, reduction of severance pay (ring costs) when changing job, harassment
and non-cooperation of insiders (see Lindbeck and Snower, 2001), relocation expenses,
psychological costs, preference for some location, or time-consuming labor mobility
(opportunity cost to look for a new house, etc., which is usually higher if the individual
has a higher wage). We show that mobility costs a¤ect directly rmshiring decisions
and, therefore, di¤usion of knowledge and TFP growth.
We study an economy with a nal goods sector and a continuum of intermediate
sectors. The only inputs used in production of the nal good are the intermediate
goods. We describe the production function of the intermediate goods sectors as a
Cobb-Douglas function with two inputs: labor and physical capital. Moreover, the
labor measure is a CES function of all types of workers hired in that sector (retained
and poached from other sectors) weighted by the amount of knowledge they have (as in
Vilalta-Bu, 2010). In Arrows analysis, externalities are only due to learning-by-doing.
Since we consider the possibility of learning-by-hiring, workers are heterogenous and
then complementarities are likely to arise. We have included the possibility of these
1Denmark is characterized by having a very particular labor market, with highly exible individual
employment relationship combined with a generous unemployment benets system. This labor market
has been named exicurityand it is found to enhance labor mobility. A full description of the Danish
labor market is provided in Madsen (2003). Labor mobility occurs mostly in the unskilled blue-collar
workers, which could mean that most labor mobility in Denmark does not imply knowledge di¤usion
and therefore, does not necessarily foster economic growth.
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complementarities through the CES function. As in Arrow (1962), the learning of one
sector is a function of the investment made the last period in that sector. As a result,
the level of knowledge in a sector is going to be the accumulated stock of physical
capital in that sector. Nevertheless, rms do not take into account this externality in
their decision making.
The properties of the symmetric equilibrium of this economy depend on the assump-
tion on the aggregate production function. We distinguish between two particular cases.
First, we assume that the parameters of the economy are such that the reduced form of
the aggregate production is an AK function. As a consequence, the equilibrium path
does not exhibit transition and coincides with a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) along
which the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and consumption grow at the same constant
rate. Interestingly, TFP is endogenous and depends on labor mobility, which at the
same time depends on the substitution among types of labor.
Second, we assume that the aggregate production function exhibits decreasing re-
turns to scale (DRTS). In this case, the economy converges to a steady state where
GDP and consumption remain constant. The equilibrium exhibits transition and we
compare this transition with the one obtained in a model with no labor mobility.
Finally, we analyze how other labor market ine¢ ciencies may reinforce or even be
the cause of mobility costs. We show that mobility costs are increasing in labor income
taxes. This implies that labor income taxes may directly a¤ect TFP. As a consequence,
labor income taxes are not only the cause of a lower individual labor supply, as showed
in Prescott (2004), but also of a lower productivity and then a lower wage. We also
show, by introducing labor search in our economy, that not only search costs amplify
labor mobility costs, but also take the role of these mobility costs. Thus, search costs
may directly a¤ect TFP. We nd that countries with higher labor market tightness
will be more a¤ected by mobility costs than countries with low market tightness and,
similarly, mobility costs will matter more in the periods of high labor market tightness
(economic booms) and less in recessions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the full model. In
Section 3 we study the equilibrium of the economy. In Section 4 we introduce two
labor market ine¢ ciencies into the model other than mobility costs and analyze how
they interact with these mobility costs. In particular we consider labour income taxes
and search costs. Conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
2. The model
Consider an economy with a perfect competitive nal goods sector and a continuum
of intermediate sectors with constant measure S. As in Ethier (1982) or Kim (2004),
the technology in the nal goods sector is dened by the following constant elasticity
of substitution production function:
Y =

S(1+v) 1
Z S
0
Y i di
 1

; (2.1)
where Y denotes nal goods production and Yi is the amount of intermediate good of
sector i used in the production of the nal good, the elasticity of substitution between
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two intermediate products is measured by 1= (1  ) ; with   1; and v measures scale
e¤ects. As Romer (1990) and many others have shown, these scale e¤ects modify the
growth rate. In order to focus on the growth e¤ects of labor mobility, we eliminate
these scale e¤ects by assuming that v = 0:
Any nal goods rm solves the following prot maximization problem:
max
fYig
Y  
Z S
0
piYi
subject to (2.1), where pi is the price of the intermediate good of sector i in units of
the nal good. From the rst order conditions of this maximization problem, we obtain
the inverse demand of any intermediate good as
pi =

Y
Yi
1 
S 1: (2.2)
Intermediate goods sectors use labor and physical capital. Workers are innitely
lived and in each period learn the knowledge of the sector where they are employed
without any cost (learning-by-doing). Firms are interested in the knowledge a worker
has learned in the last period. Following Arrow (1962), knowledge of sector i is related
to the stock of capital in that sector. In particular, we assume that the knowledge of
sector i coincides with the average per worker stock of physical capital in that sector,
ki.2 Since learning is appropriated by workers, it is not internalized by companies when
taking their own investment decisions. However, the amount of knowledge accumulated
is a determinant of the hiring decisions of the rm. In fact, by hiring workers from other
sectors, each period rms can learn from the investment decisions made in other sectors.
Denote by ji the amount of workers from sector j that are hired in sector i. As already
stated above, they have embodied knowledge of sector j, kj . We call them poached
workers. Similarly, let i be the amount of workers of sector i hired by the same sector
i, which have knowledge of sector i. We call them retained workers.
In order to include the possibility of learning-by-doing and of learning-by-hiring
from poached workers, we assume that the production function of sector i is
Yi =

i
ki

+ q
Z S
0

ji
kj

dj


K1 i ;
where Ki is the stock of physical capital in sector i;  2 [0; 1] measures the return from
learning,  2 (0; 1=) measures the di¤erences in the returns from learning between
poaching and hiring, 1= (1  )  0 is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
types of workers, with   1 and  2 (0; 1) measures the labor income share. The
2Arrow (1962) assumes that learning in sector i is a function of the investment made in the last period
in that sector. As workers do not move across sectors in the seminal paper by Arrow, this assumption
implies that the accumulated knowledge in a given sector coincides with the stock of capital. In order
to make comparisons with the original paper by Arrow, we must assume that: i) rms are interested in
the knowledge a worker has learned in the last period and ii) learning is accumulated from the stock of
capital. These two assumptions imply that, even with mobility across sectors, the knowledge of workers
coincides with the average stock of capital in the last sector where they have been employed. Thus,
these two assumptions allow a direct comparison with the Arrow (1962)s original paper.
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parameter q  0 measures the ability of learning-by-hiring. This function can be
rewritten as
Yi =
"
i
Ni
ki

+ q
Z S
0
 
ji
Ni
kj
!
dj
#

| {z }
 i
Ni K
1 
i : (2.3)
where Ni is total employment in sector i: The variable  i measures TFP. When q = 0,
i = Ni and  i = k

i . In this case,  i is an exogenous variable that increases with
the capital stock as in the seminal papers of the endogenous growth literature (see
Arrow, 1962; Barro, 1990; Rebelo, 1991; and Romer, 1986, among many others). In
contrast, when q > 0; the TFP is endogenous and depends on the hiring decisions and,
specically, on the ability to both retain workers and to hire workers from other sectors.
This occurs because if q > 0; sectors can always learn from other sectors through labor
mobility. In this case, the labor market a¤ects TFP by means of modifying labor
mobility.
Firms in each sector maximize prots in a perfect competitive market, i.e.
max
fi;ji ;Kig
piYi   (r + )Ki  
Z S
0
wji
j
idj   wiii;
subject to (2.3), where r is the rental cost of capital,  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate,
wji is the salary paid in sector i to those workers hired from sector j and w
i
i is the salary
paid in sector i to those workers retained in the same sector. The rst order conditions
with respect to i; 
j
i ; and Ki are, respectively,
pi
"
1 + q
Z S
0
 
ji
kj
i
ki
!
dj
#

 1
 1i k

i K
1 
i  wii; (2.4)
pi
"
1 + q
Z S
0
 
ji
kj
i
ki
!
dj
#

 1
q

ji
 1
kj
k
( )
i K
1 
i 
 
i  wji ; (2.5)
(1  )pi
"
1 + q
Z S
0
 
ji
kj
i
ki
!
dj
#

K i 

i
ki = r + ; (2.6)
where equations (2.4) and (2.5) hold with equality whenever i > 0 and 
j
i > 0,
respectively.
We assume that there are mobility costs and that these mobility costs are propor-
tional to the wage. In order to hire an external worker, the rm has to pay her at least
the same wage as in her initial rm plus mobility costs, i.e.
wji  mwjj ; (2.7)
where m   1 > 0 measures mobility costs as a percentage of the wage. Perfect com-
petition in the labor market implies that the previous relations holds in exact equality,
i.e. wji = mw
j
j for all j: Note that the labor mobility cost introduces an ine¢ ciency in
the labor market as the cost of a worker depends on the sector from where she has been
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hired. In fact, the labor income net of mobility costs obtained by a poached worker is
wjj : This implies that the net labor income w
j
j does not depend on the particular sector
a worker is employed, but on the sector she has been employed, since this determines
the specic knowledge of the worker.
The economy is populated by a large family with N members. Each member
supplies inelastically one unit of labor. The family net labor income is
R S
0 w
i
iidi +R S
0
R S
0 w
j
j
j
ididj; where note that w
j
j is the wage net of labor mobility costs. This labor
income can either be consumed or invested. Then, the budget constraint of the family
is
Nc+ _A = rA+
Z S
0
wiiidi+
Z S
0
Z S
0
wjj
j
ididj; (2.8)
where c is individual consumption and A are nancial assets. The membersutility
function is
u(c) =
c1    1
1   ; (2.9)
where 1= > 0 measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The family max-
imizes
R1
0 Ne
 tu(c)dt subject to equations (2.8) and (2.9), where  is the discount
factor. From this maximization problem, we obtain that the consumption growth rate
satises
_c
c
=
r   

: (2.10)
The capital market clearing condition is A = K; whereK =
R S
0 Kidi is the aggregate
capital stock. The nal goods market clearing condition implies that
Y = C + _K + K +M; (2.11)
where Y is GDP, C = Nc is aggregate consumption and M measures the aggregate
mobility costs in units of nal goods production. These mobility costs are dened as
M =
Z S
0
Z S
0
(m  1)wjjjididj: (2.12)
The model is closed with the labor market clearing conditions. Let Ni be the number
of workers that has been employed in sector i: Then, the market clearing condition for
these workers is
i +
Z S
0
jidj = Ni; for all i: (2.13)
The market clearing condition in the labor market also implies thatZ S
0
Nidi = N: (2.14)
Finally, combining equations (2.13) and (2.14) we obtainZ S
0
idi+
Z S
0
Z S
0
jididj = N: (2.15)
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3. Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the symmetric equilibrium path, where the intermediate
sectors are of identical size and, thus, Kj = Ki for all i and j: This assumption and
equations (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) imply that wii = w
j
j = w; i =  and 
j
i = . Equation
(2.1) implies that GDP is Y = SYi and the price level of the intermediate good is p = 1:
Moreover, equation (2.14) implies that Ni = N=S workers are employed in each sector.
The per capita stock of capital then satises k = K=N = SKi=SNi = ki = ki for all i.
To characterize this equilibrium, we dene the variable x = = as a measure of labor
mobility. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, the rst order conditions (2.4), (2.5) and
(2.6) simplify as follows:

h
1 + qSxk( 1)
i

 1 S
N
 1
 1k1 (1 )  w; (3.1)

h
1 + qSxk( 1)
i

 1 S
N
 1
qx 1 1k1 (1 ) (1 )  mw; (3.2)
(1  )
h
1 + qSxk( 1)
i


S
N

k( 1) = r + ; (3.3)
where equations (3.1) and (3.2) hold with equality whenever  > 0 and  > 0, respec-
tively. Moreover, the labor market clearing condition (2.15) becomes
 =

N
S

1
1 + Sx

; (3.4)
and, from equation (2.3), GDP per capita is equal to
y =
24 1 + qSxk( 1) 1
1 + Sx
35 k1 (1 ): (3.5)
Finally, combining equations (2.11) and (2.12), and noting that _k = _K=N , we obtain
_k = y   c  k  

S
N

(m  1)wSx; (3.6)
Let us use equation (3.5) to summarize the main assumptions of the model and
emphasize the main di¤erences with respect to Arrows analysis. In fact, this pro-
duction function coincides with the AK production function in the seminal paper by
Arrow (1962) when q = 0: We depart from Arrows analysis by considering the pos-
sibility of learning-by-hiring (positive q). Obviously, we need to assume heterogeneity
of workers to allow for learning-by-hiring. Moreover, as there are di¤erent types of
workers, complementaries are likely to arise. We have included the possibility of these
complementarities in the model through the parameter .
Denition 3.1. A dynamic equilibrium of this economy is a path fx; ; c; k; w; r; yg
that, given the initial stock of capital k0; solves the system of di¤erential equations
(2.10) and (3.6), and satises equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.5), (3.4) and the transver-
sality condition lim
t!1e
 tc k = 0:
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We claim that the equilibrium path is interior when the amount of retained and
poached workers are both positive. In this case, equations (3.1) and (3.2) hold with
equality and, from them, we obtain a non-trivial expression of labor mobility:
x =
h q
m

k( 1)
i 1
1 
: (3.7)
However, when the equilibrium path is non-interior, then either x = 0 or x ! 1.
The following proposition characterizes the conditions making the path of the dynamic
equilibrium interior.
Proposition 3.2. When  < 1 the path of the dynamic equilibrium is interior and
labor mobility is measured by equation (3.7), and when  = 1 the path of the dynamic
equilibrium is non-interior and there exists a value of per capita aggregate capital,ek = (m=q)1=( 1) ; such that,
a) If k > ek then  = 0;  = N=S2 and x!1.
b) If k < ek then  = N=S;  = 0 and x = 0.
c) If k = ek then  > 0;  > 0 and x is indeterminate.
Proof. When  < 1 there is a value of x > 0 such that equations (3.1) and (3.2) hold
simultaneously in equality. This value does not exist when  = 1: In this case, if k > ek
then only equation (3.2) holds with equality, which implies that  = 0: If k < ek then
only equation (3.1) holds with equality, which implies that  = 0: Finally, when k = ek
then equations (3.1) and (3.2) hold with equality for any value of x:
This proposition shows that the value of the elasticity of substitution determines
labor mobility. Obviously, the relevant case is that of an interior equilibrium. Therefore,
from now on we assume that  < 1 and then labor mobility is determined by equation
(3.7). As follows from this equation capital accumulation modies labor mobility when
 6= 0: Capital accumulation increases labor mobility when it increases (decreases) the
ratio between the marginal productivity of own workers and the marginal productivity
of hired workers. The e¤ect of capital on this ratio depend on the value of  and of :
If  > (<) 1 capital accumulation increases the learning from workers hired from other
sectors (the same sector). This causes an increase (decrease) in this ratio when workers
are highly substitutes ( > 0) and a reduction when workers are highly complementaries
( < 0) : Finally, if  = 0 then capital accumulation does not change the ratio of
marginal productivities and then it does not modify labor mobility.
Using equations (3.3) and (3.4), and afterwards equation (3.7), the interest rate can
be written as
r +  = (1  )
 
[1 + Smx]
1

1 + Sx
!
| {z }
h(x)
k( 1) (3.8)
Note that in this dynamic interior equilibrium path, the interest rate is not constant and
the equilibrium exhibits transition. However, this transition is driven by two di¤erent
forces: the diminishing returns to capital and learning-by-hiring. The rst force arises
when  < 1 and the second one arises when labor mobility is not constant, which
requires q > 0;  6= 1 and  > 0:
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We combine equations (3.5), (3.4) and (3.7) to obtain
y = h (x) k1+( 1); (3.9)
and we combine equations (3.1), (3.5) and (3.7) to obtain
w = 

1 + Sx
1 + Smx

y: (3.10)
We use equations (2.10) and (3.8) to obtain a di¤erential equation governing the path
of consumption,
_c
c
=
(1  )h (x) k( 1)      

; (3.11)
and we substitute equations (3.9) and (3.10) into equation (3.6) to obtain
_k
k
=

1  

(m  1)Sx
1 + Sxm

h (x) k( 1)   c
k
  ; (3.12)
where x is dened as a function of capital in equation (3.7).
Denition 3.3. Assume that  < 1: Then, a dynamic interior equilibrium is a path
fc; k; x; yg that solves the system of di¤erential equations (3.11) and (3.12), and satises
equations (3.7) and (3.9) and the transversality condition lim
t!1e
 tc k = 0:
The properties of the dynamic equilibrium will strongly depend on the operativeness
of the sources of transition. In the following section we assume that  =  = 1 and
the equilibrium will not exhibit transition and the long run equilibrium will exhibit
sustained endogenous growth. In Section 5, we assume that  < 1 and  6= 1 and the
equilibrium exhibits transition but, because of the decreasing returns to capital, growth
is exogenous.
4. Endogenous Growth
In this section we characterize the dynamic equilibrium when  = 1 and  = 1: As
follows from Proposition 3.2 and equation (3.7), when  = 1 labor mobility is constant
even along a dynamic interior equilibrium path. This implies that the interest rate is
constant. Obviously, this implies that the consumption growth rate, dened in equation
(3.12), is also constant. Moreover, from equation (3.9), we obtain that GDP per capita
simplies as
y = h (x) k; (4.1)
which is an AK production function. TFP is measured by h (x) and it is endogenous
as it depends on labor mobility. Finally, as it is standard in AK models, the nal
goods market clearing condition implies that along the dynamic equilibrium the capital
stock grows at the same constant growth rate than consumption, which implies that
the equilibrium does not exhibit transition. Then, we have a BGP along which GDP
and consumption grow at the same constant growth rate.
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Proposition 4.1. Assume that  = 1  = 1 and  < 1. Then, the equilibrium is
interior and the economic growth rate  is
 =
(1  )h (x)     

:
Using the growth rate in Proposition 4.1, it can be shown that a larger mobility
increases growth when  > 0 and reduces growth when  < 0: The intuition is simple.
If  > 0; workers are substitutes and then an increase in mobility enhances the marginal
product of capital which rises the growth rate. The opposite occurs when  < 0 as in
this case workers are complementaries. This implies that a large mobility that reduces
labor mobility will increase growth if  < 0 and it will reduces growth when  > 0:
Similarly, an increase in the number of sectors, S; will increase the growth rate if and
only if  > 0. Thus, increasing the number of sectors accelerates growth only when
di¤erent types of workers are su¢ ciently substitutes. The intuition is that increasing
S reduces workers from any sector but increases the total number of workers in the
rest of sectors. This implies that the chance of substitution from retained workers to
poached workers from other sectors increases. This substitution enhances growth if
these workers are su¢ ciently substitutes and reduces growth otherwise. Finally, note
that if q = 0 and thus there is no labor mobility then h (0) = 1 and  = (1 )   / :
This is the expression of the long run growth rate in the Arrows economy.
5. Exogenous Growth
When  < 1; the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale (DRTS)
and the economy converges to a steady state where capital and consumption remain
constant.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that  < 1,   1 and 0 <  < 1. Then, there is a unique
and saddle path stable steady state.
6. Growth e¤ects of other labor market ine¢ ciencies
In this section we show that di¤erences in either taxes or the labor search tightness
among countries can explain di¤erences in both the growth rate of the economy and
labor mobility. Moreover, we show that even in the case of absence of mobility costs,
search costs take the role of these mobility costs.
6.1. Labor income taxes
Let  2 (0; 1) be the labor income tax rate. In this case, the non-arbitrage condition in
the labor market implies that workers employed in sector j must obtain the same wage
net of taxes and of labor mobility costs in any sector where they are hired, so that
(1  )wji = (1  )wjj + n;
where n amounts for the labor mobility cost. As in the previous sections, we assume
that this mobility cost is proportional to the gross wage, n = dwjj ; and then
(1  )wji = (1  )wjj + dwjj :
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Note that this equation implies that wji = bmwjj ; where bm = 1 + d1  : Thus, labor
mobility cost is increasing in the labor income tax rate, which implies that the tax rate
increases the distortion due to labor mobility cost. Therefore, taxes may indirectly
a¤ect TFP through labor mobility.
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Figure 2. Labor taxes and labor mobility.
Source: data on labor mobility from Jolivet, Postel-Vinay et al (2006) and Total tax
wedge from OECD year 1997 (Total tax wedge including employer payroll taxes
(average rate in % based on two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average
earnings and the other at 33 %, 2 children))
Assume also that government revenues are returned to consumers as a lump-sum
transfer so that there is no wealth e¤ect. Then, the only distortion due to taxes is
the substitution e¤ect that, as mentioned, increases the labor mobility cost. This
conclusion and the analysis in this paper imply that those countries with a larger
tax rate are also those countries with a larger mobility cost and a smaller growth
rate. This theoretical conclusion is supported by empirical evidence. Although not
signicant, the correlation between total tax wedge and TFP growth in the period
1994-2008 is negative (-0.318). Moreover, the relationship between total tax wedge and
labor mobility is clearly negative and signicant, with a correlation of -0.7058. Figure
2 shows that countries with low labor taxes such as US, UK or Ireland have high labor
mobility, while countries with high labor taxes such as Italy, Belgium and France have
low mobility.
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6.2. Labor search costs
Let us introduce labor search in our economy. Contrary to the typical search models,
we have neither unemployment nor separation rate (rms that close down). Instead, we
have on-the-job-search: individuals who work in a rm may be actively searching for
another job. In this environment, a rm in sector i opens a vacant V ji when it wants to
poach a worker from sector j. This vacancy has an associated cost, ji . Search is costless
for workers. The intertemporal prots maximization problem of a representative rm
of sector i is now
max
fIi;Ki;V ji ;ji ;ig
R1
0 e
 rt

piYi   wiii  
Z S
0
wji
j
idj  
Z S
0
jiV
j
i dj   Ii

s:t: _Ki = Ii   Ki;
_i =  hii +
Z S
0

1  hji

jidj; (6.1)
_
j
i =  ji + gjV ji ; (6.2)
and equation (2.3), where Ii denotes capital investment. The novelty with respect to
our baseline economy is that since opening a vacancy has a cost, rms always want to
retain poached workers. This means that poached workers will become retained workers
in the following period. Therefore, the choice of retained and poached workers is now
a cumulative process. Equations (6.1) and (6.2) describe the labor ows in the rm,
where hi is the proportion of retained workers that leave the rm, h
j
i is the proportion
of poached workers of type j that leave rm i and gj is the probability that a vacancy
type j is lled in.3
From the rst order conditions with respect to Ii and Ki we have that the value
of the marginal productivity has to be equal to the capital cost and depreciation, i.e.
piFKi = r + ; where Fa is the derivative of Yi with respect to a: Combining the rst
order conditions with respect to V ji ; 
j
i and i evaluated in the (symmetric) BGP, where
pi = 1; _v
j
i =
_hji =
_hi = 0; and assuming that the vacancy costs are proportional to the
hiring wage, ji = z
j
iw
j
i ; we obtain
 
Fi   wii

(hi + r   ) =  

F
ji
  wji

1 +
zji (1+r )
gj


1  hji
 :
This equation says that the expected actual value of the surplus arising from poach-
ing a marginal worker has to be zero, i.e. the expected actual value of the marginal
productivity of a poached worker has to cover the expected actual value of wages and
rms search cost.
Assuming that the mobility cost is a proportion d of the wage, the non-arbitrage
condition in the labor market implies that wji = (1 + d)w
j
j : Applying this condition
3Note that the probability of lling in a vacancy of type j depends on the total number of type j
vacancies opened in the economy and the number of individuals of type j looking for a job.
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to the previous equation implies that the hiring cost for a poached worker is bm =
(1 + d)

1 +
zji (1+r )
gj

times the wage of a retained worker in rm j.
Dene the matching rate function for workers of type j as f j = f
 
uj ; v
j

where
uj is the workers rate that is on-the-job-searching in sector j and vj is the number of
vacancies for workers of sector j over the total amount of workers of type j, and let
f be homogeneous of degree one, increasing in both arguments and concave. Noting
that gj = f
jNj
vjNj
and dening the labor market tightness by j = v
j
uj
; we have that
gj = f
 uj
vj
; 1

= g
 
j

; so that g0
 
j

< 0; that is, there is a congestion externality:
the more vacancies per worker available, the lower the probability of lling them in.
Then, bm can be rewritten as bm = (1 + d) 1 + zji (1+r )
g(j)

: The higher the labor market
tightness, the higher the hiring costs. In words of Pissarides (1994), if there is a drop
in search activity then the total wage increases. Thus, vacancy costs not only amplify
labor mobility costs, but also take the role of these mobility costs. Therefore, vacancy
costs may directly a¤ect TFP growth. The implications of this result is that countries
with higher labor market tightness will be more a¤ected by the mobility costs than
countries with low market tightness and, similarly, mobility costs will matter more in
the periods of high labor market tightness (economic booms) and less in recessions.
7. Concluding remarks
We have considered labor mobility as one of the factors that accounts for di¤erences
in TFP growth across countries. In doing so, we have introduced learning-by-hiring in
a model of learning-by-doing, so that while sectors may have free and instant access
to the knowledge developed within their own sector (learning-by-doing), they can only
learn from other sectors by hiring external workers (learning-by-hiring). Hence, hiring
decisions and thus worker mobility a¤ect knowledge exploitation and thus the TFP. We
have analyzed the equilibrium outcome of such an economy and obtained that labor
mobility makes growth at least as high as that of Arrows economy as long as the
production function exhibits a su¢ cient degree of substitution between the di¤erent
types of workers.
Moreover we have shown how other labor market ine¢ ciencies may reinforce or
even be the cause of mobility costs. In particular, we argue that mobility costs are
increasing in labor income taxes and, therefore, labor income taxes might a¤ect TFP.
We also have introduced labor search in the economy and showed that the higher the
labor market tightness the higher the hiring costs, so that search costs could take the
role of mobility costs. The important implications of these two examples is that any
other labor market ine¢ ciency, as the existence of either trade unions or an insider-
outsider bargaining power, may partially explain di¤erences in TFP and then income
per capita across countries, even when they have a similar level of capital per capita.
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Proof of proposition 5.1
First we show existence and unicity of the steady state. To this end, we combine
(3.11) and (3.7) and we impose _c = 0 to obtain h (x)
1
c = b
1
cx where
b =

 + 
1  

m
q
 (1 )
( 1)
,
and
c =
 (1  ) (1  )
 (  1) :
Note that
@h (x)
1
c
@x
=
S
c
h (x)
1
c

(m  ) +mSx (1  )
 (1 + Sx) [1 + Smx]

:
It follows that @h(x)
1
c
@x > (<) 0 if and only if  > (<) 1: Given that h (0) = 1 > 0 and
that h (1)! 0 if  < 1 and h (1)!1 if  > 1; there is a unique steady state when
 < 1:
If  > 1 then there is the possibility of multiple steady states. Given that h (0) > 0;
this steady states satisfy the following condition @h(x)
1
c
@x < (>) b
1
c if it is an odd (even)
steady state.
Next, I proceed to show saddle path stability when  < 1: Note rst that @ _c@c = 0;
@ _k
@c =  1 and (1 )h(x)k
( 1)  

@ _c
@k
= c
(1  )k( 1)


h0 (x)
@x
@k
+  (   1) h (x)
k

= c
(1  )h (x) k( 1) 1

26664Sx

(m  ) +mSx (1  )
(1 + Sx) [1 + Smx]

 (  1)
1  

+ (   1)| {z }
Q(x)
37775
Note that @ _c@k < 0 if  < 1: This implies that the equilibrium is saddle path stable when
 < 1: When  > 1 and there are multiple steady states, note that
Q (x) =
@h (x)
1
c
@x
c

x
h (x)
1
c

 (  1)
(1  )

+ (   1) =
=
@h (x)
1
c
@x
c
b
1
c

 (  1)
(1  )

+ (   1)
=

1  
b
1
c
"
@h (x)
1
c
@x
  b 1c
#
which is negative in odd steady states and positive in even steady states. Implying that
odd steady states exhibit saddle path stability and even steady states are either stable
or unstable.
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